THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR AND THE BATTLE OF PYDNA Combined-arms Tactics and the Real Reasons for the Roman Victory

The Third Roman–Macedonian War marked a decisive catastrophe for Macedon, culminating in the loss of its independence. While the defeat is often ascribed to the inherent superiority of Roman legionary tactics over the Macedonian system, Graham Wrightson challenges this interpretation by placing responsibility squarely on King Perseus. Through close engagement with the primary sources, he reconstructs the conflict with particular attention to Perseus’s strategic choices and battlefield conduct. The evidence supports the long-standing view that Perseus displayed excessive caution in the early stages of the war. More importantly, Wrightson argues that Perseus fundamentally mismanaged the Macedonian army’s combined-arms potential by adopting an unduly defensive posture, most notably at Pydna. The Macedonian sarissa phalanx—slow-moving but devastating when advancing—required an offensive plan integrating its frontal power with a decisive heavy cavalry strike on one flank. Perseus’s refusal to finance the recruitment of 10,000 Gallic horsemen further deprived him of the cavalry strength necessary to seize the initiative. This study offers a rigourous and engaging reassessment of the war and provides valuable new perspective on the long-standing debate over the legion’s supposed tactical superiority to the phalanx.