It is the perceived wisdom that the Gallipoli Campaign against the Turks in 1915 was deeply flawed and that inadequate planning and bad maps contributed to much unnecessary slaughter. Yet these two experts on terrain and mapping in the Great War contend that the consequences of this have been overplayed and by considering the evidence – both in little-used archives and studies of actual terrain features – they present the truth; that adequate intelligence was available in various forms but was either ignored or not correctly collated or distributed.
GRASPING GALLIPOLI Terrain, Maps and Failure at the Dardanelles, 1915
The failure of the Gallipoli campaign was instantly blamed on a great untruth – that the War Office was unprepared. This book, incorporating information unavailable elsewhere, shows that in fact the WO and the Admiralty had amassed a huge amount of data. Aerial reconnaissance had played a part – even Lawrence of Arabia had done his bit! The War Office knew all about Greek plans to capture the peninsula and one plan was even Anglo-Greek. The authors examine all the intelligence and how it was used or ignored and in the process.